WHAT IS “THE NORM” AND WHOSE NORM ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

It’s been some three months since this hobbit went into retirement mode.

Recently, a local politician was interviewed on mainstream media which gave much food for thought to the small brain of this hobbit. Hence this, the first of the occasional posts since my retirement announcement in January this year.

The interviewer asked him, “Is it because doctors also anyhow charge? Should something be done about the way doctors’ bill patients?”

He answered “I think they should. I won’t say a lot of doctors are doing this, maybe a small percentage, could be making use of the situation to perhaps prescribe certain tests and certain procedures that are not the norm. so that I hope that with the new changes, this will cause such behaviour to be lessened”.

The fundamental question here is what is the norm? And who decides what the norm is?

To doctors, the basic tenet is encapsulated in this line that is found in the SMC’s Physician Pledge – “make the health of my patient my first consideration”. This is the “duty of care” that we owe our patients, and which our patients expect of us. This is repeated in the SMC Ethical Code:- “Uphold patients’ welfare and best interests as your highest consideration, Section 3(a)(ii).

This duty of care is so important that in our Ethical Guidelines, it is found in Part A (Good Clinical Care) under Section A1: Duty of Care. (i.e. it is the first section of the first part of the Ethical Guidelines)

I hope no one should have any doubt about the primacy of the duty of care that we owe our patients in all that we do as doctors. In fact, this hobbit has been told by two senior lawyers that the duty of care doctors owes their patients can be considered to be a fiduciary one.


What is a fiduciary relationship? According to ChatGPT, it is –

“A  fiduciary relationship is a legal or ethical bond of trust between two parties where one person (the fiduciary) is required to act in the best interests of another (the principal or beneficiary). It is one of the highest standards of care recognized by law, requiring the fiduciary to prioritize the other party’s needs above their own.”

Scholarly papers have been written on this subject1. The local (SMC) ethical framework can be largely traced back to the 4-principle framework of Beauchamp and Childress: Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, Autonomy and Social Justice. And here is what they wrote in their seminal work “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” about fiduciary relationship, ‘The patient-physician relationship is a fiduciary relationship—that is, founded on trust or confidence; and the physician is therefore necessarily a trustee for the patient’s medical welfare”

I guess if there was something akin to the Ten Commandments of Medical Ethics, Duty of Care would be a strong candidate to be the First Commandment.

Other fiduciary relationships include lawyer-client, company director and shareholders, guardian and ward etc

Arising from this duty of care, we derive norms for how doctors must conduct themselves when dealing with patients. And when these norms are seriously deviated form, doctors can be punished by a Disciplinary Tribunal. This is provided for under Section 59D(1) of the Medical Registration Act. Under subsection (c) and (d), it is stated:

c) to have been guilty of professional misconduct

d) to have failed to provide professional services of the quality that is reasonable to expect of him

The test for professional misconduct is often also called the Low Cze Hong test2 and there are two limbs to this test (Chat GPT)

1. The First Limb: Intentional Departure 

This applies to an intentional and deliberate deviation from accepted professional standards, often involving breaches of the SMC Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines (ECEG). 

2. The Second Limb: Serious Negligence 

This applies to serious negligence representing an abuse of the privileges of medical registration. It typically involves indifference to patient welfare or duty, and usually does not include isolated, non-intentional technical mistakes. 

As you can see, words like “deviation from accepted professional standards” and “indifference to patient welfare and duty” all point to the importance of upholding this duty of care and the consequent normative behaviour and practices that this duty obliges every doctor to subscribe to.

In summary, as doctors, we have to live within the professional norms of the profession, of which the duty of care we owe to patients, i.e. putting their interests before ourselves, is the cornerstone. Serious deviation from the duty of care and these consequent norms may expose ourselves to disciplinary action, which may include fines, suspensions and striking-off.

Next, we move on to the insurance industry. You may think the insurance companies and their agents work on the same norms as doctors. For a start, and let’s get this over with, the company directors of an insurer owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders, but they don’t owe a fiduciary duty to its policyholders.

What rules the financial sector is the test of suitability while what rules the healthcare and doctor’s lives is the fiduciary duty that we owe our patients. So, there are two standards: the fiduciary standard and the suitability standard.

The test of suitability that is commonly used in the financial (and hence insurance) sectors require a financial or insurance company to understand their clients by asking questions to see if the client (and his circumstances) is suitable for the product the company is trying to sell.

Take the example of Insurer A that has 3 insurance products and they are all deemed suitable for Client B. The insurance agent doesn’t have to recommend the policy that he thinks is best for Client B. He can choose one of the 3 suitable plans that makes the most money for himself and the insurance company he works for to sell to Client B, provided that there is a “reasonable basis” for the agent to do so. And that is perfectly fine in the insurance industry since it is the suitability standard that applies here. The suitability standard is the insurance industry’s norm.

Of course, there have been cases where financial advisors have been punished by the regulator for selling a product that is entirely unsuitable for the client. For example, a retiree that needs a steady low-risk low-return investment is instead sold a high-risk, high-return investment product.

Now contrast this with the medical profession and the fiduciary standard that is applicable.

From the patient perspective, the doctor must always act in the best interest of the patient, even when it is NOT in the doctor’s interest. A good example is a medical oncologist who fails to offer a surgical option to his patient when evidence shows surgery shows better (or even just comparable) outcomes and only offers chemotherapy. The medical oncologist would be considered to have failed in the discharge of his (fiduciary) duty of care to the patient. If the patient complains, the doctor will, in all likelihood, be punished by the Disciplinary Tribunal. This fiduciary standard is the norm of the medical profession.

Another example would be how a ruptured cerebral aneurysm is treated. Nowadays, one can treat a ruptured aneurysm mainly by two ways: open surgery and endovascular procedure if a patient is brought by (usually) a SCDF ambulance quickly enough to a restructured hospital

An endovascular procedure is the treatment of choice, since endovascular procedures show significantly better results than open surgery. It is the standard of care now if it is available. And applying the current standard of care is certainly a good way of discharging a doctor’s duty of care to his patient. Admittedly, not all hospitals offer this service, but if the patient is brought to a hospital that offers endovascular procedure quickly enough, it is a no-brainer. I am told reliably that in hospitals that offer this service, 80% to 90% of ruptured cerebral aneurysms are treated by endovascular procedures and only the remaining 10% to 20% are treated with open surgery. This is a testament to the quick response time of our SCDF ambulances and our restructured hospitals as well as the excellence of our interventional radiologists and their supporting staff.

However, there are Critical Illness Plans that dictate that reimbursement takes place only when open surgery is performed and endovascular procedures are not reimbursable. Therefore, what is sold as a Critical Illness Plan covering ruptured cerebral aneurysms effectively only covers 10% to 20% of such cases.

This obviously makes no sense at two levels. At the first level, to the doctors and other healthcare workers, why would the company not cover a superior treatment modality that is in-line with current standards of care?

At the second level, why would anybody pay money for such a plan which in reality covers only 10% to 20% of cases of what is obviously a life-threatening emergency?

But all this makes sense at the third level, to the insurance company and the insurance agent that sold this policy. It makes money for both the company and the agent and at the same time it is a “suitable product” for the client (I suppose from a certain reasonable perspective, a 10% to 20% chance of getting a successful payout is “suitable”).

In any case, this hobbit thinks Critical Illness Plan is a bloody misnomer. Let me suggest a more appropriate name: –  Critical Illness But Ancient Intervention Plan (CIBAI Plan).

It is also why an insurance case manager can ask why a doctor did not try conservative treatment for an anal abscess first before performing surgery. I suppose trying conservative treatment instead of draining the abscess is “suitable”, for at least a few days to a week, never mind the pain of having the abscess and the increased risk of getting septicaemia.

Which is why doctors and insurers can never live together happily ever after. They two work on different premises and norms that are often in conflict with one another. Currently when there is a conflict, it is often the suitability standard that prevails over the fiduciary standard. Insurance norms eat the medical profession’s norms for lunch and insurance-based medicine trumps evidence-based medicine almost all the time in Singapore when there is an insurance claim. Should a doctor demand that the fiduciary standard prevails, he may run the risk of being delisted from an insurer’s panel with no reasons given.

In an ideal world, the relevant regulator(s) should step in and legislate that the fiduciary standard is applicable even for insurers and insurance agents for health insurance products. This will ensure that public and the patient’s interest is well-served. Doing so will also address the persistent friction and unhealthy tension that exists in this sector, where the standards of the medical profession and the insurance industry intersect.

I wish the politician who gave that interview stated that, in reality and on the ground, the applicable norm today is the insurance norm that is based on the suitability standard. Let’s call a spade a spade.

And to that unenlightened interviewer who asked if the problem was due to doctors who “anyhow charge” – I hope she knows that there are MOH fee benchmarks that insurance panel doctors have to follow. What is more, most IP insurers only reimburse at the lower end of the benchmarks. So how to “anyhow charge”? Can this interviewer don’t anyhow ask such questions which shows her shallowness? Even if there were such doctors who “anyhow charge”, they are very few in number, which in turn, means they do not move the needle at the national level in terms of controlling healthcare costs in the private sector.

1 Ludewigs S, et al. J Med Ethics 2025;51:59–66. doi:10.1136/jme-2022-108539;

Ethics of the fiduciary relationship between patient and physician: the case of informed consent

2 Tan Siang Yong, Medical Legal Dimension of Professionalism, SMA News, Pages 26-27, June 2015.

It Is What It Is

Recently, a House Officer was suspended for the maximum period of three years by a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT). The House Officer had falsified two Medical Certificates (MC) so that she could take the days off.

Many doctors expressed concern at the severity of the sentencing.

Not many doctors may know about this, but there is a SMC document called the Sentencing Guidelines, which is available on the SMC website. It was issued in 2020 after the work by a SMC Sentencing Committee was completed. This Committee was chaired by a Court of Appeal Judge. Other members included another High Court Judge and a Judicial Commissioner, along with many senior doctors and several MOH officials.

The medical profession is given the privilege of self-regulation in Singapore through the SMC and Disciplinary Commission (which commissions DTs and is now independent of the SMC), but this is not an absolute privilege. Ultimately, the decisions of DTs can be subjected to appeal to the Court of 3 Judges (C3J), and this includes decisions related to sentencing.

So while the DT can decide on the severity of sentencing, ultimately its decisions must be able to stand a good chance of being upheld by the C3J should an appeal occur. An appeal can come from either the SMC’s lawyers or the Respondent (i.e. the doctor being charged).

Within the Sentencing Guidelines, there is a subsection called “Dishonesty” (Page 18) under the Section “Removal of Doctor’s Name from Register (s53 (2)(a) of MRA)”. This provision under the MRA or Medical Registration Act is what we doctors commonly call the “Struck Off” clause.

To cut a long story short, the Sentencing Guidelines state that the default sentencing for acts of dishonesty is striking off. There are some conditions and circumstances where the DT may impose a lighter sentence but I won’t go into the details here. In any case, the DT is in this case did NOT impose a striking off sentence but instead suspended the house officer for 36 months. The house officer’s lawyers had asked for 20 months’ suspension but they also did not appeal against the 36-month sentence. 36 months is the maximum period a doctor can be suspended under the MRA.

The DT in its Grounds of Decision, referred to 3 previous SMC cases and 4 Law Society cases and the Harm-Culpability Matrix for guidance to arrive at the final sentence of a 36-month suspension. Personally speaking, I thought the 36-month sentence was a tad harsh. I cannot see how the public’s trust and confidence in the medical profession can be “severely” harmed by a house officer falsifying MC on two occasions, even though the house officer’s culpability was high if not total. I think the public can discern the impact between dishonesty by a house officer and an experienced doctor and the consequent loss of public confidence. But that’s just me. We halflings always err on the merciful side. Maybe that’s our weakness.

But it is what it is.

However, this hobbit was kind of taken by surprise by this article that appeared shortly before the SMC announced the suspension of the house officer earlier this month, “Lawyer who sent misleading letters to 22 doctors fails in bid to quash $18,000 penalty” (The Straits Times, 13 August 25”

https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/lawyer-who-sent-misleading-letters-to-22-doctors-fails-in-bid-to-quash-18000-penalty

This case involved the sending out of misleading letters to 22 doctors that practised in TTSH, KKH and SGH. The letters stated that as required by the High Court, these 22 doctors had to give a statement to the law firm which the lawyer practised in, which was untrue and misleading. There was no such High Court requirement. According to the Straits Time report, the letter further stated “The doctors were told not to discuss their testimony with anyone, including their legal advisers and insurers. The letters also warned of “severe penal consequences” if the doctors did not comply”.

To give you an idea of how serious this is, the CMBs of all three aforesaid hospitals filed a complaint against this lawyer with the Law Society. The exact wording of one of the two charges against the lawyer is as reproduced below

https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2025_SGHC_159

“First Alternative to Second Charge” (Section 5)

You, AAAAAAA (NRIC No. XXXXXXX), an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, are charged that you, took unfair advantage of various potential witnesses in High Court Suit No. HC/S 702/2020 and/or acted deceitfully towards them or otherwise contrary to a legal practitioner’s position as a member of a honourable profession, by issuing and sending letters dated 12 May 2022, 13 May 2022, 25 May 2022 and 22 June 2022 to these potential witnesses, which said letters created a misleading impression of and/or misrepresented the legal requirements in connection with the requirements for giving evidence in High Court Suit No. HC/S 702/2020 and the consequences of non-compliance with those alleged requirements, and such conduct amounts to a breach of Rule 8(3)(a) and/or Rule 8(3)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you are thereby guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966.

To summarise, there were actually two charges. The first charge involved breaching Rule 7(3) while the second charge involved Rule 8(3)(a) and 8(3)(b). The one reproduced above is only the second charge. The defendant lawyer was found guilty of both charges and fined $18,000. The lawyer then appealed against the sentence. The case was heard before a High Court Judge who upheld the decision of the DT.

To bring more clarity to laymen such as doctors, halflings and other folks reading this, this hobbit reproduces the text of the relevant Rules of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 for the second charge here:

Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rule 8(3)(a) and (b) states:

(3) A legal practitioner

  • must not take unfair advantage of any person; and
  • must not act towards any person in a way which is fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to the legal practitioner’s position as a member of an honourable profession

The question that befuddles this hobbit (who admittedly is untrained and not at all clever at these legal stuff) is how did this lawyer of apparently more than 30 years’ experience only get a $18000 fine for doing something that is “fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise contrary to the legal practitioner’s position as a member of an honorable profession” AND also to have taken “unfair advantage of any person”? Is issuing misleading letters that are deemed “fraudulent and deceitful…” also not an act or acts of dishonesty? It would take a long stretch of anyone’s imagination that a person trained in law and court processes was not aware that these letters were misleading.

On the other hand, the house officer was found guilty of bringing disrepute to the medical profession (under Section 59D(1)(b) of the MRA) because she was dishonest and consequently suspended for 36 months.

How do we make sense of the sentencing for these two cases; one involving a lawyer of many years’ experience and a house officer with only a few months’ record of being a provisionally-registered doctor?

Perhaps we should not. Doctors are not lawyers and vice-versa. It is what it is.

The Sure and Quiet Death of Duty of Care

As reported in The Straits Times, MOH recently published data that showed Integrated Shield Plans (IPs) varied widely in terms of coverage and lifetime price (Integrated Shield Plans lifetime premiums vary widely across insurers, MOH comparison shows” (1 July).

This is hardly surprising and shows that there is some form of competition between insurers and collusion does not exist, which is good.

However, as Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health Associate Professor Wee Hwee Lin noted, “This is clearly useful for people to review their existing insurance policies but with caveats. It is not possible for people with existing medical conditions to switch providers.”

Price is easy to understand, but coverage less so. As journalist Ms Salma Khalik noted in the above article, “To confuse matters further, the lowest coverage may not come from the insurer charging the lowest premiums”.

Understanding coverage requires much more technical knowledge and research effort than comparing price or premiums.

Or for that matter how insurance companies operate.

To understand this, the hobbit would like to point you to another Straits Times article published on 19 June 2024 written by a CEO of a financial advisory firm, “When it comes to financial advice, do your own homework” (by Chuin Ting Weber). This hobbit must confess that he has found this to be one of the most illuminating articles published this year. Here is what she wrote,

“The truth, or the whole truth?

Financial advice, like medicine and law, is a licensed profession, Professionals know more than the people they serve. Often, clients don’t know what they don’t know. This knowledge asymmetry imposes an ethical responsibility on a financial institution (FI) and its representative to go beyond basic honesty, to care about their clients’ interests.

How far this responsibility goes, however, depends on the standard applied. In Singapore, FIs are held to the “suitability” standard (emphasis mine); financial products recommended must be appropriate to the consumer’s financial situation and goals…..

….However, this still falls short of a higher “fiduciary” standard adopted by some countries. A fiduciary must make recommendations in the best interest of the client, even if it means decreased remuneration for the FI or the adviser”.

She then gave the example that a retiree seeking a stream of income was given a recommendation by a financial adviser or FI to buy an insurance product when she should have gone for a higher CPF Life payout by getting the retiree to top-up her CPF Retirement Account. Recommending her to buy the insurance produce was not untruthful, but “the more complete truth” would be recommending her to consider topping up her CPF Retirement Account.

She adds “If fact, FIs can even argue that their advisers should not do that (recommending the retiree to top up the CPF Retirement Account). Because while their responsibility towards the consumer (i.e. the retiree) is on a suitability basis, their responsibility towards shareholders is on fiduciary basis”.

After reading this article, this hobbit was deeply troubled. But this also explains why the medical profession is often at logger heads with the insurance companies and the twain shalt never meet (at a place of peace) given the gulf in fundamentals.

Doctors owe a duty of care to our patients. This is to be found in the SMC Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines. In reality, duty of care is really fiduciary duty in medical-speak. That means we must do our best and put the interests of our patients before our own interests.

On the other hand, Financial Institutions (all insurance companies that sell IPs are FIs licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore) puts the interests of its shareholders above that of its customers. As aforesaid by Weber – the FI owes a fiduciary duty to its shareholders but not to its customers/policyholders; it only has to offer “suitable” insurance products to its customer, which may not be in their best interests.

When “suitable” is not good enough

Contrast this to an actual case that went before SMC and the Courts. In 2017, a prominent private sector oncologist was suspended by the Courts for 8 months after an appeal was filed for a SMC case. In fact, the Courts said that had it not been for the long delay by SMC to hear the case, the suspension would have been 16 months.

What did this oncologist do to be punished so heavily? Answer: He had “wrongly held out false hope” to the family by claiming that there was a 70% chance of the cancer patient responding to medical chemotherapy and for not offering surgery as the preferred option for treatment of the patient’s cancer.

That is not to say that chemotherapy was quackery. In this case, chemotherapy was an accepted form of treatment. It was just that surgery was supposed to be better and it wasn’t offered as an option for the patient to consider.

Now if the standards of regulation for FIs were applied to this oncologist, he probably would have gotten away with offering chemotherapy as the (only) option although he may be still found to be guilty of giving the patients’ family false hope.

This is because while surgery was the better option, chemotherapy cannot be considered to be unsuitable; similar to the logic behind the example given in the abovementioned Straits Times’ article – topping up of the CPF Retirement Account was the best option, but recommending the retiree to buy an insurance policy was also “suitable”.

We owe a fiduciary duty or duty of care to our patients, while FIs and financial advisors and insurance agents only need to offer something that is suitable. Which is also why Weber recommends that when it comes to the matter of financial advice, do your own homework!

A wise crack may counter that isn’t it the same with subsidised healthcare in our public healthcare institutions (PHIs)? As a subsidised patient, one has no right to choose their own attending specialist physicians. The hospital will just assign you a specialist. It’s your good luck if you get assigned the professor or Head of Department. Tough luck if you get assigned an Associate Consultant instead. Certainly, an Associate Consultant is “suitable” (because he is indeed a specialist), but he or she can hardly be considered to be the best option the PHI can offer.

Well, there is a difference here. If the case turns out to be complex and beyond the abilities of the AC, he is also duty bound to seek the input of a more senior specialist or even refer the patient to the more senior specialist. This happens at no extra cost to the subsidised patient. If the case is simple and does not warrant the input of more senior specialists, then it can be argued that the outcome is likely not to be significantly different whether the case is handled by an AC or a SC.

The FI test of suitability is a tradeoff between enriching self (the shareholders of the FI and/or the financial advisor) and doing what is best for the policyholder. This is in contrast to the duty of care or fiduciary duty that we owe our patients whereby enriching oneself at the expense of the best interest of one’s patient is NOT allowed.

The triumph of the standard of suitability

Now let us look at another real-life example in the form of an incident involving medical oncology that has happened recently. A medical oncologist was dropped from a preferred provider of an IP panel. No reasons were given, as usual. Any IP insurer will tell you that they don’t have to give any reasons whatsoever for including or dropping a doctor from their panels.

This oncologist began to reflect over why was she (and her colleagues in the same practice) dropped by the insurer. She had heard from reliable sources that her group’s rates were quite reasonable and in fact, she hadn’t raised her rates for 5 years.

She surmised that the reason she was dropped was that she had sometimes used cancer drug treatments which are not on the MOH’s Cancer Drug List (CDL) on a few patients after conventional drug treatments had not worked. She is a domain expert in her area and often gets referrals from other doctors for difficult and complex cases. When the usual options are not effective, she would try something not on the CDL if the patients had bought riders that explicitly allowed for such use (Class A to E of Non-CDL Treatments) as described in the circular issued on 2 September 2022 by the Life Insurance Association, Singapore (LIA). In some of these cases, due to the high cost of treatments, she has often given discounts as well.

If what she suspects the reason behind her being dropped by this insurer is true, then this is a good example of what can happen when fiduciary duty meets the test of suitability. She had tried doing what she thought was best for the patient, given the patient’s dire situation and what the patient’s IP policy is supposed to cover. But by doing so, she will suffer financially going forward because she is no longer a panel doctor with this insurer, i.e. her patient’s best interest has been served at a loss to herself.

On the other hand, the insurer, despite providing coverage for non CDL treatments, may also be sending out a message to other panel doctors that they do not encourage doctors from trying their best (even when it is permitted under the terms of the policy) but instead should just do what is suitable and sufficient, and that the interests of the insurer come before the patient.

The suitable slope to perdition

The future of medicine in especially the private sector will therefore be a contest between a doctor trying to fulfill his duty of care/fiduciary duty to the patient and also funders of healthcare such as insurers trying to impose a lower standard of “suitability” on doctors. The balance of power is clearly on the side of the insurers because they control the funding and they are also accountable to no one on how doctors are chosen to be put on or dropped from preferred provider panels.

In the short term, this is not a bad thing because if everyone just dishes out suitable care, healthcare costs will probably be lower and therein lies the temptation. But in the long run, the patient will suffer as doctors align themselves with their funding masters –  the insurers. This is because the obvious knowledge asymmetry between insurers, providers on one side and the patient/policyholder on the other side is so great that it is not easy for the patient/policyholder to discern he has been given just “suitable” care instead of the best care that owing a fiduciary duty/duty of care requires.

Clearly, in the face of the enormous power and financial resources wielded by FI insurers that are only expected to operate on the standard of suitability, doctors in the private sector must align themselves with the insurers to survive. The tenet of duty of care that we teach in medical schools and to our young resident doctors must eventually yield to such great a countervailing force (of the insurers and their test of suitability) when many of them leave for the private sector.

And before we know it, we may already be well on a fast and slippery but surely suitable slope to perdition.

POSTNOTE (Dated 23 Aug 24): since the publication of this post, a lawyer, presumably linked to the case involving the oncologist that was quoted in this article has contacted SMA more than once with regard to what he or she considers to be a factual error in this post. This lawyer (with reference to the Disciplinary Tribunal’s findings and the C3J’s Decision) has stated that the use of the word “preferred” is incorrect to describe surgery as an option and that the adjective used should be “viable” instead.

There are a few things that need to be stated or restated here

This hobbit was merely quoting the mainstream media (aka The Straits Times) when he used the word “preferred”. Instead of asking lowly me to correct this word, maybe the mighty Straits Times should be asked to make this correction instead. (The news article was published in 2017 and written by Ms Salma Khalik). https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/health/prominent-cancer-doctor-ang-peng-tiam-given-8-month-suspension-by-supreme-court

All readers should also note for historical reasons, this hobbit is known as “hobbitsma”. But really, this hobbit has been an independent blogger for years and this is clearly stated in the first post on this wordpress platform. So while certain equally old coots in SMA know how to contact me (usually by smoke signal or using the middle-earth equivalent of a mail pigeon), SMA doesn’t tell me what to write or not to write.

Finally and most importantly, the main subject matter of this post is comparing the test of suitability with the duty of care or fiduciary duty doctors owe their patient. And really, it doesn’t matter whether surgery is “viable” or “preferred”. The crux of the matter is that under the duty of care he owes the patient, the doctor would be found wanting if he had not offered surgery as an option, whether surgery was viable or preferred is irrelevant to the outcome at the SMC or C3J level. On the other hand, under the test of suitability, the doctor would probably be found to be OK if he had only offered chemotherapy as the only option offered because chemotherapy is a “suitable” option. Under the test of suitability, one does not have to offer ALL suitable options; the doctor has to offer only one – and that was the thrust of the ST article by Weber.

Therefore, the key point of this hobbit’s discussion that affects the outcome of this case is NOT whether surgery is a viable or preferred option, but which test was applied or is applicable – Duty of Care or Test of Suitability.

So, really, this Postnote is unnecessary. But I have to write this to get my life back. Maybe it is about time to retire and sail off to Valinor

Musing About Mistakes

Living With Mistakes

A letter to the Forum of The Straits Times that was published on 12 June 24 caught this hobbit’s eye. It was written by a young doctor, Dr Amreena Shamit, who purportedly works in a GP clinic. The letter was titled, “Doctors, don’t be too hard on yourselves when a mistake occurs”. It is a very well written letter, very encouraging and uplifting in tone and substance. She advises how we doctors should learn to live with the mistakes we make and move on so that we can help even more patients. She ends off by saying, “making mistakes is part of the risk of being in the healthcare profession. After all, for every mistake we make how many patients do we actually help? Maybe if we knew the answer, we might not give up so easily”.

But as this old coot of a hobbit is about to tell you, there are mistakes, and then there are mistakes. And while we can and should live with our mistakes and move on, not everyone shares that view. Put simply, mistakes come in all shades and sizes. Like beauty (and ugliness), mistakes often lie in the eye of the beholder. Some mistakes are unfortunately punishable and even career-ending.

Mistaken about Mistakes

There have been also people who have been mistaken about mistakes. The celebratory case of Dr Lim Lian Arn comes to mind. A patient had complained against Dr Lim for not informing her of the side effects of a hydrocortisone and lignocaine injection. Dr Lim pleaded guilty and the SMC Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) subsequently fined him the maximum amount of $100,000 for professional misconduct. The outcome was so unexpected that MOH then requested that SMC appealed against the decision of its own Disciplinary Tribunal. The Court of Three Judges (C3J) overturned the decision of the DT1.

The C3J noted that not all mistakes amount to professional misconduct and are therefore punishable. The Judges noted “As we observed to Mr Chia (SMC’s lawyer) in the course of his submissions, there must be a threshold that separates relatively minor breaches and failures from the more serious ones that demand disciplinary action. Were it otherwise, doctors would find it impossible to practise in a reasonable way. For a medical practitioner to be charged and found liable under the MRA (Medical Registration Act), the misconduct must be more than a mere technical breach of the relevant standards”. (Para. 30 of the Judgment, SMC vs Lim Lian Arn, [2019] SGHC 172). This is a case where the C3J concluded that the DT and the lawyers of both SMC and Dr Lim were mistaken about the nature of Dr Lim’s mistake.

To Err (Even One-off) Is Human and Sometimes Punishable

We now move on to a more recent SMC case, SMC vs Yeo Khee Hong. The Grounds of Decision of the DT was only published on 27 May 242. Dr Yeo, a GP of 38 years’ experience, pleaded guilty and was suspended for one year for failing to diagnose a case of testicular torsion in a patient that was about 15 years old when the incident occurred. Due to the misdiagnosis of epididymitis and orchitis, the patient presented late to the hospital and had to subsequently undergo an orchidectomy.

This has led to some disquiet on the ground because everybody makes a misdiagnosis from time to time. If everyone can make the correct diagnosis 100% of the time, then he would most certainly be inhuman (or not a hobbit as well).

First, this hobbit would like to say that he is in agreement that the doctor should have been found guilty of professional misconduct and sanctioned to some extent. However, the grounds of decision (GD) did not address certain issues that may come back to haunt the profession later.

Para. 26 of the GD stated, “The ASOF (Agreed Statement of Facts) further states that the applicable standard of care is (a) to consider all (emphasis mine) acute scrotal pain as testicular torsion until proven otherwise, and (b) regardless of the duration of the patient’s symptoms or whether the patient had acute or intermittent testicular torsion, to refer the patient urgently (emphasis mine) to the A&E in a hospital or a specialist. The ASOF states that that testicular torsion cannot be conclusively excluded or eliminated on history-taking and physical examination alone….”

Para. 27 further states “The ASOF states that the Respondent failed to act as a reasonable and competent doctor would have done and was in breach of the applicable standard of care”. The same paragraph then when on to describe how the misdiagnosis of epididymitis and orchitis led to the serious consequences and harm to the patient which doctors already know too well.

Para. 28 of the GD then describes how Dr Yeo had breached Guidelines A1(1), A1(4) and A2 of the SMC ECEG, which amounted “to such serious negligence that it objectively portrayed an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner, and the Respondent is thereby guilty of professional misconduct under s 53(1)(d) of the MRA”.

This hobbit is not familiar with how the DT works, but one needs to ask, does the ASOF’s applicable standard of care apply to the whole profession henceforth? Already many GPs are saying arising from Para. 26, they have no choice but to refer urgently ALL cases of scrotal pain to the hospital or specialist urgently. And my A&E colleagues are also already shaking their heads at the prospect of being asked to urgently exclude the diagnosis of testicular torsion in geriatric male patients.

When we have an “Agreed” Statement of Facts (ASOF), we have to ask – who is agreeing to what here? Presumably the parties in agreement are the Respondent (Doctor) and SMC’s lawyers, but do what they agree to in an ASOF apply to the rest of the medical profession as a new, universal standard of care?

For example, do we now really regard acute scrotal pain in a 75 year-old man as a case of “testicular torsion until proven otherwise”? Or do we say yes, we regard every case of acute scrotal pain in a 15 year-old as testicular torsion until proven otherwise; but well, for a 75 year-old, testicular torsion may well still be a rare differential diagnosis, but the scrotal pain is more likely to be something else. In other words, would the DT still have suspended the doctor for a year if this was a rare case of testicular torsion in a 75 year-old with the same clinical presentation?

The clue to this may also lie in para. 25, which stated “According to the ASOF, based on the Patient’s history of left testicular pain, the Patient’s profile and age (emphasis mine), and the Respondent’s physical examination finding that the Patient’s left testis was enlarged and tender, the Patient was at risk of testicular torsion on 27 March 2019. A reasonable and competent doctor in the Respondent’s position would have considered the possibility of intermittent testicular torsion as a differential diagnosis without first referring the Patient to the A&E of a hospital or a specialist such as a urologist or paediatric surgeon for urgent surgical assessment or exploration”.

Unfortunately, years from now, people may not understand or realise that para. 26 may have been crafted under the context given in para. 25. This hobbit thinks para. 26 could have been worded in a better way, or paras 25 and 26 could have been merged into one paragraph. Not only must we be careful with our words, we have to be careful with our paragraphing as well. The lone Para. 26 as it stands now, can lead to unnecessary referrals to A&E or specialists if not defensive medicine.

It is also important to note that Dr Yeo was found guilty of professional misconduct under the second limb of the landmark Low Cze Hong case, which is “where there has been such serious negligence that it objectively portrays an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner”.

Here, it is important to revisit again the C3J’s Judgment of the Lim Lian Arn case, in particular para. 38 of the Judgment, “Serious negligence portraying an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner would generally cover those cases where, on a consideration of all the circumstances, it becomes apparent that the doctor was simply indifferent to the patient’s welfare or to his professional duties, or where his actions entailed abusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by the patient. On the other hand, it would not typically cover one-off breaches of a formal or technical nature where no harm was intended or occasioned to the patient or where harm was not a foreseeable consequence; nor would it ordinarily cover isolated and honest mistakes that were not accompanied by any conduct which would suggest a dereliction of the doctor’s professional duties”.

Interestingly, in para. 66 of the DT’s GD for Dr Yeo’s case, it was stated that this incident was “one-off” and “out of character” for him. Also, in para. 68, the DT considered this to be “an isolated incident”.  There was no mention that the doctor was “indifferent to the patient’s welfare or to his professional duties”. While harm was “occasioned”, it was certainly not “intended”. Perhaps the strongest point made in the GD against the Respondent was that missing a diagnosis of testicular torsion would lead to a “foreseeable consequence” of orchidectomy, significant pain, suffering and morbidity.

Would therefore an “isolated” breach of Guidelines of A1 and A2 that was “one-off”, “out of character” for the Respondent amount to serious negligence/professional misconduct and a suspension of one year? The GD described how it arrived at the one-year sentence, but did not clarify how the doctor’s act crossed the threshold of serious negligence, which was unfortunate, especially when there are countervailing factors such as “isolated”, “out of character” and “one-off”.

Perhaps the SMC can follow up with an effort to explain these points so that the entire profession can learn clearly from this incident on how an isolated incident of what is largely of a technical nature can cross the threshold to be considered as serious negligence/professional misconduct.

Make Mistakes When You Are Young(er)

This hobbit would also like to make the observation that seniority is not a mitigating factor when you make mistakes. In fact, according to the Courts and SMC, age or seniority is an aggravating factor. In other words, under the same set of conditions, a more senior or eminent doctor may be punished with a heavier hand than a more junior one.

This was established in the appeal to the C3J in the Ang Peng Tiam vs SMC case ([2017] SGHC 1433). This was stated clearly in para 93 of the Judgment for this case, “Seniority and eminence are characteristics that attract a heightened sense of trust and confidence, so that when a senior and eminent member of the profession is convicted of professional misconduct, the negative impact on public confidence in the integrity of the profession is correspondingly amplified”. The logic for this, as given by the C3J, is that the main aim of disciplinary proceedings is “general deterrence”, i.e. to deter the rest of us doctors from doing things in a similarly bad way. This is a concept that this hobbit has always found it hard to wrap his halfling mind around, but it is what it is. You don’t have to agree, you just have to know that it applies to all of us doctors – seniority sucks when it comes to disciplinary proceedings.

This position was also adopted by the DT in the aforementioned case involving Dr Yeo. The GD stated in para 66, “We accepted that the seniority of the Respondent is an aggravating factor. As noted in the Sentencing Guidelines, there is an overarching need in medical disciplinary cases to uphold the standing of the profession and prevent an erosion of public confidence in the trustworthiness and competence of its members. Against this consideration, we took into account the fact that the Respondent has a long unblemished track record and good professional standing. The present offence was one-off and out of character. In our view, he is unlikely to re-offend”.

Given the fact that the older you get, the higher the stakes are for you when you make a mistake as a doctor, it would be interesting to study if such a medico-legal climate foments an environment whereby more senior doctors are more predisposed to practising defensive medicine than more junior ones. That would make a fascinating study for health policy and medical ethics researchers, don’t you think?

Finally, to be absolutely clear, this hobbit really likes the letter written by Dr Amreena Shamit. It encourages us to take mistakes in our stride, to learn from them and to move on as better doctors so that more patients can benefit.

But it also important to know that for serious mistakes amounting to professional misconduct, there are circumstances and conditions that do not permit us to move on.

1https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2019_SGHC_172

2https://www.healthprofessionals.gov.sg/smc/home/Announcements/Index/the-grounds-of-decision-of-the-disciplinary-tribunal-inquiry-for-dr-yeo-khee-hong-has-been-published

3https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2017_SGHC_143

Personal Beliefs and Professional Positions

Hobbits are by nature fun-loving folks who firmly believe in the sacred value of liberty. The freedom to choose is a fundamental right hard-wired into every hobbit’s brain; unless that right is circumscribed or taken away by law. For example, you are not at liberty to choose whether to wear a mask or not once you step out of your home.

So this hobbit firmly believes that everyone has the right to choose for oneself to be vaccinated or not, and one’s children as well. We should also be allowed to choose what vaccines we want to be vaccinated with as long as the vaccines have been approved for use. Of course, with choice, comes responsibility. We have to face the consequences of our choices, be they good or bad.

Among doctors, there is a wide range of opinions and beliefs when it comes to Covid-19 vaccination. As individuals, they are entitled to their personal beliefs. And they are entitled to make choices and decisions arising from these beliefs. A doctor can choose to be vaccinated or not. We cannot take that right away from an individual, just because he happens to be a doctor.

But things may get a bit edgy when you propose a position to the public in your capacity as a doctor on something related to healthcare or a medical service or product. This hobbit believes you should be evaluated and judged in your professional capacity as a doctor.

In short, as an individual you can have almost complete liberty in choosing your personal beliefs, but not so when as a doctor, you choose your professional positions.

Take the recent two incidents involving a few doctors for example. Last month, 12 doctors penned an open letter on the risks of Covid-19 vaccination for children. They asked that traditional “killed” virus vaccines be used on children instead of the mRNA vaccines. 11 of the 12 doctors subsequently retracted the letter, including the author of the letter. The letter was addressed to “all parents deciding to vaccinate or not to vaccinate their child”. Many experts have since spoken out debunking the contents of this infamous letter.

In their retraction, these 11 doctors said “We like to withdraw all our humble ponderings, as some of our thoughts may be misunderstood by some laypersons. We will henceforth ponder in a more professional and private forum”.

This hobbit shares the same concern as the eleven doctors who retracted when it comes to “laypersons” – they need to be protected. Within the medical profession and the boundaries of civility, fellow doctors can discuss and argue different positions and viewpoints about certain contentious topics in medicine. In our careers as doctors, we have all seen robust discussions between learned colleagues on many subjects at different fora, ranging from the simple grand ward or morbidity and mortality rounds to international scientific and medical meetings.

Some positions forwarded by some doctors at times can be based on the most flimsy and unmeritorious of assumptions, but these arguments and propositions will be quickly disposed of by the majority of their peers armed with better knowledge and experience.

Unfortunately, this luxury of discernment frequently does not happen when the public is involved, simply because the public lacks the requisite knowledge to discern on highly technical matters.

It is for this reason that medical advertisement is tightly regulated in Singapore. Other than Over-The-Counter (OTC) Drugs, one is NOT allowed to advertise medicines to the public. You will not see advertisements like what you see in USA for example, where one will see many prescription drug advertisements targeted at the public.

However, in Singapore, advertisements involving prescription drugs can be found in materials that are mainly meant for doctors, dentists, pharmacists and nurses. For example, advertisement and marketing materials for prescription drugs can be found in the SMA News or SMJ.

The underlying logic here is that these professionals (and the students being trained for these professions as well) have the capacity to discern the issues therein. Hence the advertising restrictions targeted at these groups can be more relaxed. The piece of legislation called Medicines (Advertisement and Sale) Act reflects this thinking.

Well, it appears that three of the 11 doctors are now having another go at trying to dissuade people from getting vaccinated at mRNA vaccines even when they had said they wanted to “ponder in a more professional and private forum”. There is now another open letter by five doctors (of which three are from the original group of 11 doctors who retracted earlier on) asking the vaccination to be delayed for adolescents, especially males. Again, the experts have come out to debunk their argument which is based again on the most rickety of scientific foundations. Seriously folks, even though one death is too many, you cannot formulate a public health vaccination policy based on one death in which causality to mRNA vaccines is not even established.

The unwanted effects of these two episodes by a few doctors are:
• many members of the public are getting confused
• the vaccination programme is undermined
• experts have to make the effort to repeatedly debunk unmeritorious arguments forwarded by just a few doctors. A waste of their time and purportedly causing insomnia to one of the experts.

It is true that we have imperfect and incomplete information about Covid-19 and the vaccines. But the hard truth is that we still need to make decisions now based on imperfect and incomplete information where the benefits outweigh the risks to a community. And we certainly cannot make or defer making decisions based on theoretical possibilities that are NOT backed up by current data or extensive experience.

If you think about it, these doctors, in the process of publicly lobbying certain positions, are also trying, indirectly or directly, to persuade and advise the public to also believe what they believe – that mRNA vaccines should not be used.

This kind of persuasion can be likened to offering a form of health education or medical advice. Of course health education is part of the service a doctor is expected to give in a professional capacity. But this education must be of a certain quality befitting a doctor, since the public places a certain premium on information offered by doctors.

The Medical Registration Act, Section 53 (1)e states that if a doctor is found by a Disciplinary Tribunal “to have failed to provide professional services of the quality which is reasonable to expect of him” then he can possibly be punished.

To this hobbit these “professional services” would include unsolicited health education and medical advice where there is no pre-existing patient-doctor relationship. Doctors indirectly influencing the public to take or not take vaccines through the public lobbying of authorities to take a certain public health policy direction would also constitute health education and giving of medical advice.

This brings us back to be the principle that both the individual patient and the public need to be protected. We all make mistakes as doctors telling patients wrong things once in a while. But when there are repeated attempts by the same people to forward a position that is neither backed up by current scientific evidence nor an opinion from a respectable body of peers then something needs to be done.

To sum up, everyone is entitled to their opinion as individuals. Every doctor is also entitled to his profession opinion in the course of an academic or professional discussion with his peers; just be prepared to defend the opinion and failing which, understand well in advance that that position may be demolished within the medical community.

But every doctor is NOT entitled to push his professional opinion or position to the patient or the public when the position is not supported by science or a respectable body of peers. That would be unprofessional if not irresponsible.

After all, being licensed to practise medicine doesn’t mean you are licensed to practise quackery as well.

What this hobbit would really want to see is that these doctors (who are trying so hard and repeatedly trying to dissuade people from taking the mRNA vaccines in some way or the other) to meet in a professional forum with a few members of the MOH Expert Committee on Covid-19 Vaccination. The two sides can argue their case in a Zoom meeting and thousands of doctors can login to this meeting to decide for themselves which side has the stronger case. Perhaps the SMA or Academy of Medicine can organise such a forum. Stop this “open letter” business that can potentially muddle the minds of the public; meet up and argue your case out professionally doctor to doctor, based on scientific research and evidence, and let your peers judge you. If you really know your stuff, you should be able to convince a big segment of a learned audience who can then take up your case and promote your cause.

The Basket Case of Doctorxdentist (DXD)

The dust looks to have settled for now with the DoctorxDentist (DXD) saga.  On 27 Nov 20, Senior Minister of State Dr Koh Poh Koon posted this on his Facebook account:

“Many of my medical colleagues have been troubled by the methods adopted by DoctorXDentist (DxD) to promote doctors who paid for their services. It is also unclear whether some of the patient “reviews” on the DxD website are genuine and consistent with the relevant rules and regulations. Following discussions with the Ministry of Health, Singapore, Singapore Medical Association and Singapore Medical Council, DxD will now remove all doctors and dentists from their website listing unless the doctor or dentist has opted in.

MOH and SMC are continuing to monitor the situation and will make further investigations into the DxD website where appropriate. We will not hesitate to take further action if necessary. We must safeguard the integrity of the profession and protect the interests of patients”.

I hope this will draw to a close to this rather tiresome if not vexing Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) company’s past distasteful practices which they claimed to have discontinued on 22 Nov (as reported on their website). DXD has said it will now adopt an opt-in model where it will only publish names of those doctors and dentists that opt-in to collaborate with them. It stated, “All medical professionals who do not wish to be on the Find A Doctor directory will have their entire profile removed”. On 26 Nov, DXD also said it will remove all patient feedback and ratings.

Now if only DXD adopted this reasonable position from the beginning, then all this gnashing of teeth and clenching of fists would not have been necessary.

Nonetheless, even as DXD has now apparently adopted a new and reasonable position to continue their business, it is instructive to recap what it did in the last few weeks and months to incur so much indignation from the authorities and the medical community.

Let’s now have a short curious case-study of the DXD…..

An overbearing attitude that dismisses a doctor’s rights to non-association with DXD.

It claimed (as stated in the previous post) that its mission overrides a doctor’s rights to non-association. Clearly a preposterous position for a privately-owned company to adopt, given the fact it is not a regulatory authority backed by the force of specific legislation.

Instant “ownself give ownself” mandate to be the patient’s champion

As stated also in the previous post, the co-founder of DXD, a certain Tristan Hahner replied to a doctor with these words earlier in the year, ““We are required to list all doctors practicing in Singapore. In other words, our directory has to be complete in order not to mislead patients. We are allowed to display factual information available in the public directory of the Singapore Medical Council without your explicit consent”.

We now know with some certainty after clarifications from MOH, SMC and SMA that no-one required them to list all the doctors. DXD probably “ownself require ownself” and tried to give the impression that they had a “mandate from heaven”, so to speak. Until SMA called their bluff. The misleading party here is indeed DXD, by claiming that they are required to do something when they cannot give any evidence of who this requiring entity is.

Their repeated use of the word “our patients” in their communications is also very disconcerting. It implies that they actually have patients when they don’t. The fact is, when someone or some facility claims to have patients, it means that these persons or entities owe a professional duty of care to these “patients”. But this understanding must be bilateral. This hobbit thinks DXD doesn’t know what they are talking about and it’s all fluff and bluff. After all, does the “patient” even think or agree that DXD owes him a duty of care? Even for a doctor – he can’t just pick someone from the street and declare unilaterally this someone to be his patient and he owes this patient a duty of care unless this someone agrees that “Yes, Dr X is my doctor” and therefore Dr X owes this patient a duty of care.

Misrepresentation of MOH’s position

If there is one raw nerve that civil servants have – it is to be misquoted or misrepresented. DXD’s early statements claim that they have arrived at their position of compulsory inclusion of all doctors and dentists on their DXD directory after consultation with MOH’s compliance officers. With MOH’s clarification to the contrary (MOH website 20 Nov 20), this is obviously untrue.

Refusal to issue an erratum, let alone apologise

To-date, despite MOH’s request for DXD to publish the erratum on 17 Nov, DXD has yet to do so. This gave MOH and SMC no choice but to publish the erratum on their own websites on 20 Nov 20 respectively. Frankly, if I were the Health Minister, I would have thrown the POFMA (POFMA – Protection of Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act) at DXD in the face of such defiance.

Flip-flopping

DXD can flip their position faster than a prata.

Incident 1:

On 7 Nov, DXD said in Update 4 that it will be “removing all doctors who have requested to be delisted”. But on 14 Nov, it said it will “republish” these delisted names

Then, to add insult to injury, in a Business Times article (20 Nov 20), their General Manager Ms Tyr A Ding was reported to have said, “But after a closed door meeting with representatives from SMA, SMC and MOH, Ms Ding on Sunday told BT that the company has made a determined decision not to delist any private doctors” from its platform”. She was quoted as having said, “This decision is ours alone, and was made on a sound legal basis”.

22 Nov 20, DXD announces it will remove all names that request so. What happened to “determined decision not to delist…” and “This decision is ours alone, and was made on a sound legal basis”? Tsk tsk. Malu Sial.

Incident 2:

On 10 Nov 20, DXD announced that they will be publishing the full minutes of a meeting that was to be held on 13 Nov with MOH and SMA. On 13 Nov, they stated that they have requested for a “closed doors, non-prejudice meeting and will not be publishing meeting minutes”.

Unauthorised Use of SMC Website and Data

SMA announced on their website on 13 Nov 20 that SMC had informed SMA that DXD had not sought permission from SMC for use of SMC data on doctors and SMC had also not given DXD any permission to do so.

Questionable Use of Patient Feedback and Ratings + Lack of Understanding of Regulatory Requirements

On 25 Nov, SMC announced in an advisory that “Medical practitioners should refrain from participating in online SEO platforms that make use of patient feedback and ratings, as these feedback and ratings can be considered to be patient testimonials which are forbidden in G2(7) of the SMC ECEG and G2.3 of the HME”. An advisory with similar content was issued by the Singapore Dental Council. This really reflects on DXD’s failure to understand what are the prevailing professionalism and ethical standards that is imposed by the regulatory body, i.e. SMC on doctors. This is especially galling when you consider the opening paragraph of their post on 22 Nov 20:

“DoctorxDentist loves what we do, which is to partner with medical practitioners to create expert health content and bring free access to health knowledge. It is a mission that our team continues to believe in wholeheartedly”.

The first thing about partnering doctors is not to get doctors intro trouble. Duh?

When you look back at all this, it is easy for anyone to realise why DXD is such a basket case of a company. This hobbit wonders – can DXD ever achieve credibility as a serious player in healthcare with a track record such as this?

Sequence of Events

3 Nov 20

SMA sends an email to all members offering as a free service to its members, to publish a list of members who do not wish to be associated with the DoctorXDentist (DxD) website, so that the public may be informed that the DxD website does not have the support of these SMA members.

4 Nov 20 (DXD Blog)

DXD publishes statement that they “made the decision to include all doctors after our consultation with MOH Compliance Officers back in 2018…. This decision is supported by our lawyers”

7 Nov 20 (DXD Blog)

DXD publishes on its blog under “Update 4”, “we consulted a team of lawyers who abide by Private Hospital and Medical Clinic (PHMC) Guidelines and local regulatory compliance laws. They advised us to automatically list all doctors on our platform using the SMC Directory to retain an unbiased and comprehensive listing for our readers”

DXD mentioned “we would also like to respect the wishes of various bodies pending further discussions. As such, we will be removing all doctors who have requested to be delisted while we arrive at an amicable resolution for both sides”.

10 Nov 20 (DXD Blog)

“DoctorsxDentist will be meeting with SMA and MOH Regulatory officers on the 13th of November 2020 (2-3pm). We will be updating this blog after the meeting with full meeting minutes as well as resolution details.”

13 Nov 20 (DXD Blog)

“DoctorxDentist has requested for a closed doors non-prejudice meeting and will not be publishing meeting minutes”.

13 Nov 20 (SMA update to members)

The SMC has since clarified in a reply to SMA dated 12 Nov 2020 that “SMC has not given permission to DoctorXDentist to use, reproduce or appropriate the comments found on the online Medical Register on the SMC website, and neither has the SMC received any request from DoctorxDentist for permission to extract the data for use on their website. The SMC will be writing to DoctorsxDentist to seek their explanation on the above. In particular, the SMC will be requesting that DoctorxDentist refrains from using information obtained from the SMC’s website”.

14 Nov 20 (Straits Times, Docs up in arms over website listing their profiles, Joyce Teo)

“After a virtual meeting yesterday with representatives from SMA, SMC and the Ministry of Health, DxD said it will republish profiles”

19 Nov 20 (DXD Blog)

DXD publishes Update 7 at 2pm which was removed at 3:20pm. (100 minutes of existence)

20 Nov (Business Times, DoctorxDentist’s headache grows as MOH, medical bodies lean on platform, Olivia Poh and Claudia Chong)

“In a recent clarification on MOH’s website, it came to light that MOH had neither endorsed nor approved the online platform, despite statements on DoctorxDentist’s website that might have given the impression that MOH had”.

“But after a closed door meeting with representatives from SMA, SMC and MOH, Ms Ding on Sunday told BT that the company has made a determined decision not to delist any private doctors” from its platform””

“This decision is ours alone, and was made on a sound legal basis. As a company, we are unable to compromise the quality of our patients’ healthcare journey just because we are told to drop it. This would be in direct contradiction to our belief that healthcare access should be transparent and made available to all”.

22 Nov (DXD Blog)

Announces that it will work on a opt-in model (no erratum)

25 Nov (SMC website)

SMC issues advisory to all doctors not to take part in SEO platforms that have patient feedback and ratings as patient testimonials are forbidden by SMC ECEG and HME. It further stated that “ In particular, medical practitioners should not be paying for such services by purchasing packages from these platforms for the purpose of obtaining patient testimonials, as payment for such packages or services could be considered to be express agreement on the part of medical practitioners to allow patient testimonials to be part of their publicity and medical advertisement activities”.

26 Nov (Various Newspapers)

DXD announces it will remove reviews, feedback and ratings of doctors from its website

The Matrix

The General Elections 2020 are finally over. It is already tough enough for our infectious disease colleagues to fight Covid-19 before the GE, but during this GE, they also had to contend with cardiac Hepatitis A. This new disease was discovered in Singapore recently when cardiac cockles were also found to harbour the Hepatitis A virus, like the cockles that many ingest orally. Public health experts have warned that warming these cardiac cockles do not completely kill these nasty Hep A viruses; they have to completely cooked by boiling them thoroughly. Like global warming, cardiac warming has some negative consequences.

In any case, this hobbit has noticed that the see-hum in his char kway teow are getting smaller and smaller while extra see-hum now costs an addition $2. The see hum in my laksa has also gone the way of the mythological see hum that was purported to have been found in mee siam a few years back in our country.

Anyway, humming along, let us talk about the Sentencing Guidelines that were released by the SMC Sentencing Guidelines Committee recently. There is a lot of angst amongst quite a few doctors about the “new Sentencing Guidelines”, especially the “harm-culpability” (HC) Matrix. Doctors are worried that most cases will end up with lengthy suspensions and even striking off, once the matrix is applied. The “harm-culpability” matrix is not to be mistaken with the “hum-culpability” matrix that is endemic in Sengkang.

On the surface of it, the potential for stiffer sentences may appear true. But in reality, probably not. Firstly, this Sentencing Committee did not invent the HC Matrix. The Court of Three Judges (C3J) did when they heard the appeal of the Wong Meng Hang v SMC case (i.e. the “liposuction death case”) in Nov 2018, when the HC Matrix was introduced as part of the larger 4-step Sentencing Framework. The HC Matrix originally applied to cases where patients were physically harmed in the course of clinical care delivered by the offending doctor. This Sentencing Framework and its constituent HC Matrix are already case law with effect from Nov 2018 and all SMC hearings should take reference from the Framework and Matrix for cases that fall under the category that the HC Matrix was meant to be to applied to.

What the Sentencing Committee did was to extend the coverage of the Framework and HC Matrix to cases that did not involve physical harm or clinical care. Harm caused may also include “non-physical harm (e.g. psychological or emotional distress), potential harm, as well as harm caused to public confidence in the medical profession, to public health and safety or the public healthcare system”. (para 44 of Sentencing Guidelines, SMC, June 2020). We don’t really know why the Committee extended the coverage. Maybe it’s administratively more expedient to have one Framework and Matrix to apply to all cases instead of having different frameworks and matrices for different types of cases. Bearing in mind that the majority of Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) members are doctors, it is probably better to have one Framework and Matrix to apply rather than multiple frameworks and matrices. In any case, the SMC June 2020 Sentencing Guidelines do not mention the rationale of this and I guess we will never know.

So is this the thin end of the wedge as we know it?

Not quite. The first thing that we need to know is the Sentencing Framework and HC Matrix only applies after the DT has decided that the doctor is guilty under the Medical Registration Act (MRA). A doctor is punished by SMC most commonly for professional misconduct which is under subpara (d) of Section 53(1) of the MRA.

Section 53(1) of the MRA is reproduced here

53.—(1)  Where a registered medical practitioner is found by a Disciplinary Tribunal —

(a)to have been convicted in Singapore or elsewhere of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty;
(b)to have been convicted in Singapore or elsewhere of any offence implying a defect in character which makes him unfit for his profession;
(c)to have been guilty of such improper act or conduct which, in the opinion of the Disciplinary Tribunal, brings disrepute to his profession;
(d)to have been guilty of professional misconduct; or
(e)to have failed to provide professional services of the quality which is reasonable to expect of him

Arising from the now famous or infamous Lim Lian Arn case, we now know that the threshold for attaining professional misconduct is actually higher than what some DTs or SMC’s lawyers thought. This hobbit wrote about this in Aug 2019 and some of the stuff is reproduced here:

Personally speaking, the most helpful information in the Judgment (of the Lim Lian Arn Appeal case) is it makes out clearly how professional misconduct is to be proven (summarised for brevity and not necessarily for high fidelity):

  • Establish what is the applicable standard
  • Establish whether there is departure from this standard
  • Prove whether this departure is serious enough to constitute professional misconduct. With respect to negligence, it must be “serious negligence” and departure from standards must be “serious disregard” or “persistent failure” to meet the standards set out under the ECEG.

The Judges took effort to state that the lawyer for LLA “was mistaken” when he regarded that a breach of a “basic principle” in the ECEG amounted to professional misconduct. They also stated (para. 30 of Judgment) “there must be a threshold that separates relatively minor breaches and failures from the more serious ones that demand disciplinary action. Were it otherwise, doctors would find it impossible to practise in a reasonable way”. Hurray.

The extent and coverage of expert evidence was also elaborated on. The Judgment stated that it was not enough for an expert to merely state what he or she thinks how things should be done. The expert must also present “the underlying evidence and the analytical process by which the conclusion is reached” (para 43) for the expert opinion to hold sway.”

Some doctors have also opined that some DTs are more likely to find a doctor guilty when the harm is great. This is an example of “working backwards”. If the patient has been greatly harmed, then the doctor is more likely to be culpable or guilty and since the harm is great, then the penalties must also be greater, especially according to the HC matrix. This is the circuitous logic that some doctors are afraid may happen on the ground. 

There is indeed a possibility of this happening although there is no hard evidence to suggest this. But if this indeed happens, then it is an example of taking two independent variables (culpability and harm) and linking them up as what some epidemiologists may describe as confounding variables which will in turn lead to errors in conclusion. Let’s be clear about this – It is only after the determination of guilt has been made by the DT does the degree of harm and culpability apply in the realm of sentencing. Not the other way around.

Para. 39 of the Sentencing Guidelines makes this clear:

“When a complaint is referred to the DT, the DT should establish that the departure in question (e.g. from the standards provided by the SMC Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines, or from the standards observed by reasonable practitioners in the profession) is so egregious that it warrants disciplinary action. The DTs should then determine whether the doctor is guilty of the charge(s). Only then, should the DTs proceed to consider the appropriate sentence to be imposed”.

The one exception to this “working backwards” approach  is in the case when no one actually suffers any harm at all. I suppose when no one suffers any harm, then it is most likely that the doctor will not be found guilty of professional misconduct. Even then, abovementioned factors such as potential harm etc have to be considered.

In summary, the Framework and HC Matrix elucidated in the SMC June 2020 Sentencing Guidelines are really nothing very new. They are just extensions of coverage to what was already in force in case law since Nov 2018. What is more important is that since the Lim Lian Arn case, it is clear that the threshold for finding a doctor guilty of professional misconduct is a high one, higher than previously thought by many. And that, really warms the cockles of this hobbit’s heart. The “hum-culpability” matrix is alive and well here.

A Scary Bedtime Story – the SSC Case

The appeal to the Court of Three Judges (C3J) on the psychiatrist Soo Shuenn Chiang (SSC) case had a familiar ring to it. This is evident right from the word go, as delivered by the Chief Justice in The Judgment of the case,

The opening paragraph of the Judgment states,

“For the second time within a short span, this court is faced with a potential miscarriage of justice in a case involving alleged medical misconduct. Once again, the Singapore Medical Council (“the SMC”), which is prosecuting the case, has changed its position from that which it maintained before the Disciplinary Tribunal (“the DT”); once again, the task of the DT was made more difficult by the decision of the respondent, on this occasion, Dr Soo Shuenn Chiang (“Dr Soo”), not to contest the charge or the facts upon which it was based; and once again, the DT failed to carefully consider all the relevant facts and circumstances before it pronounced the respondent guilty. On this occasion, the DT then meted out a sentence that was in excess of both that sought by the SMC and that submitted by Dr Soo. And once again, an outcry from the medical profession sparked a reaction from the SMC”. (emphasis mine in bold and italics)

This hobbit is not a halfling of letters, and with his limited language skills, has to resort to Hokkien to describe what he thinks was the Chief Justice’s mood when he delivered this – in one word – sian. Sian in Hokkien means tired, with more than a tinge of frustration perhaps.

Later on in para. 68 of the Judgment, it was stated, “We make this observation because it seems to us unsatisfactory that reliance has been placed on the medical profession’s propensity to protest loudly over the decisions of disciplinary tribunals and/or courts, with dire warnings of the spectre of defensive medicine, in order to secure in individual cases the result that is desired and/or perceived to be just. The doctor against whom a charge is brought also has a responsibility to look after his own interests. Dr Soo could have contested the case on liability, and subsequently, even after pleading guilty to the Charge, he could have appealed against at least the sentence imposed on him, but he chose to do neither. It is not unreasonable in such circumstances to hold that he ought to lie on the bed that he has chosen to make for himself”.

This hobbit begs to disagree with the learned and wise C3J on the point of a “spectre”. First, it is not a “spectre”, but reality. The consequences of the SMC DT’s judgment (before the C3J’s Judgment) on the Lim Lian Arn (LLA) H&L Case is an increase in both the practice of avoidance defensive medicine and a general rise in price for performing a H&L injection. This is not a spectre, but evidence documented through research and published in a peer-reviewed medical journal. Seventh Month has come and gone and it is now Halloween, but this hobbit hasn’t seen any Ghost of Defensive Medicine yet. If you ask me, it’s more like the Golem of Defensive Medicine, which is very hard to kill once it comes to life.

It is true that a doctor “has a responsibility to look after his own interests”. Unfortunately, “his interests” are also defined according to ‘his’ perspective – which in this case, seems to be Dr SSC wants to plead guilty, pay the fine and move on and get on with his own life. It is his prerogative and perspective, not anyone’s else. Just as we enshrine patient autonomy and patient-centric-ness in promulgating the Modified Montgomery (MM) Test, it should be argued that here, in disciplinary tribunal proceedings, a doctor’s interest has to be defined from a doctor-centric perspective, not public interest-centric or medical profession-centric.

And certainly, arising from such a basis, the doctor has “to lie on the bed that he has chosen to make for himself”. In fact, there is no strong evidence that Dr SSC was unwilling to lie in this bed he made for himself. We shall nominally name this the “SSC bed”.

But what about the other 15,000 or so doctors licensed to practise medicine in Singapore? In our English Common Law system based on legal precedents, it appears that we too have to possibly, if not probably, lie in the same bed, or at least a bed of similar proportions and design, with mattresses, bed sheets and blankets of similar specifications as the SSC bed, when faced with a situation similar to Dr SSC.

That, my friends, is the nub of the problem.

Many of us do not have “the propensity to protest loudly over the decisions of disciplinary tribunals and/or courts” because we felt Dr SSC was dealt unfairly by the DT. Yes, unfairness to Dr SSC is a starting point for dissatisfaction, but the crux of the matter is that the $50,000 fine or $100,000 fine (LLA case) could also apply to me. SSC’s bed can also become my bed. Other than anger, fear is also a very powerful motivator to “protest loudly”.

Legal minds may argue that there is a good chance that Dr SSC’s bed may not fit me when my case is argued in a DT or a court when the SSC legal precedent is tested in real life again. This hobbit always finds this sort of argument rather callous from a doctor’s perspective. After all, which doctor wants to be a “test case” for a legal principle? I would rather be a test case-patient for a new experimental surgery to remove my kidney than a test case in a court.

Therefore, we must assume that the bed made by Dr SSC for himself to lie in, should also apply to some 15000 other doctors as a legal precedent. Is there any other prudent way to look at it?

Even though the appeal from SMC to appeal against itself has succeeded and the case against Dr SSC has been thrown out, many other questions still remain.

Moving forward, the quality of the investigative work of SMC has to questioned. How much can a Complaints Committee (CC) and DT rely on the SMC investigators’ work when they come to their conclusions over a case? In this case, the “facts” were not verified, which led to wrong conclusions being made. As the saying goes- garbage in, garbage out.

Secondly, because the case was thrown out, the issue of sentencing became moot. But it would have been terribly interesting if the C3J had also looked into and commented on how the DT arrived at a fine of $50,000, which was well in excess of what both parties (the SMC lawyers and Dr SSC’s lawyers) asked for.

In other words, there are actually two SSC beds. The first is the bed of pleading guilty and conviction in SSC’s case; this bed had been dismantled and such an outcome therefore made looking at the bed of sentencing unnecessary. But in all probability, most doctors were most uncomfortable lying in the SSC bed of sentencing, not the other bed of pleading guilty.

Finally, a point of secondary importance that could be looked into would be to see if there was any deception or falsehood on the part of the complainant’s brother and husband in firstly asking for the memo from Dr SSC, and secondly in the statutory declaration made by both of them subsequently. If there was deception and falsehood, what further actions could be taken?

All in all, the SSC case has been a very scary incident for many of us, even though many of us didn’t see any ghosts, wraiths or spectres…..

 

A Final Many Words On The LLA Case

And so, it has come to pass, on appeal from SMC against its own Disciplinary Tribunal (DT), our wise Judges have ruled that Dr Lim Lian Arn (LLA) is not guilty of professional misconduct. Everybody has to pay their own costs, including Dr Lim and SMC’s lawyers. Other than the lawyers and the DT, everyone lived happily ever after. And so the story comes to a happy ending.

Not quite.

Learning Points from the C3J Judgment of the LLA Case

First, a few learning points can be gleaned from the Judgment that was issued on 24 July 2019 by the Court of Three Judges (C3J):

One key point was that the SMC’s position to call for a five-month suspension for Dr LLA was “wholly unwarranted” and that the “DT also fell into error by too readily accepting Dr LLA’s submission (made in response to the five-month suspension) that the maximum fine of $100,000 would be appropriate”. (para. 63). This hobbit couldn’t agree more. To me, it means that how a sentence is called for by SMC must be dependent on the specific facts of the case, and that the several calls (at least in four previous cases) before the LLA case by the Court of 3 Judges (C3J) for harsher sentences and sentence re-calibration against doctors must be taken in their specific contexts on these occasions and not to be interpreted as “general instruction” for all cases. This is helpful.

Personally speaking, the most helpful information in the Judgment is it makes our clearly how professional misconduct is to be proven (summarised for brevity and not necessarily for high fidelity):

  • Establish what is the applicable standard
  • Establish whether there is departure from this standard
  • Prove whether this departure is serious enough to constitute professional misconduct. With respect to negligence, it must be “serious negligence” and departure from standards must be “serious disregard” or “persistent failure” to meet the standards set out under the ECEG.

The Judges took effort to state that the lawyer for LLA “was mistaken” when he regarded that a breach of a “basic principle” in the ECEG amounted to professional misconduct. They also stated (para. 30 of Judgment) “there must be a threshold that separates relatively minor breaches and failures from the more serious ones that demand disciplinary action. Were it otherwise, doctors would find it impossible to practise in a reasonable way”. Hurray.

The extent and coverage of expert evidence was also elaborated on. The Judgment stated that it was not enough for an expert to merely state what he or she thinks how things should be done. The expert must also present “the underlying evidence and the analytical process by which the conclusion is reached” (para 43) for the expert opinion to hold sway.

On the subject of informed consent, the Judgment reiterated essentially the basic requirements of the Modified Montgomery (MM) Test:

  • Establish what is relevant and material information to the patient. Materiality of a risk or complication is generally determined by its severity and likelihood and “largely a matter of common sense” (para. 50).
  • Establish that the doctor possesses this information
  • Establish whether the doctor can justifiably withhold this information from the patient

On the subject of defensive medicine, the Judgment defined or described it as “the situation where a doctor takes a certain course of action in order to avoid legal liability rather than to secure the patient’s best interests”. The Judges said that it is a mistake to classify “information dumping” (i.e. doctors overwhelming patients with a deluge of information in order to protect themselves legally) on patients by doctors as defensive medicine because “giving too much information will not avoid legal liability” (para. 54)

Informed Consent

As this hobbit has said below, in our local context, “just follow law”. Whatever the Judges have said is case law and therefore has to be adhered to. But perhaps in my senescence and folly, please allow this old coot blabber a few irrelevant and immaterial things about three points – informed consent, defensive medicine and information dump

MM Test

The MM test is largely a matter of common sense. As my professor (now emeritus professor) once said to me when I was a medical student, “common sense is uncommon”. Were it not so, it would not have been necessary to introduce the Bolitho Addendum to the Bolam test. The Bolitho Addendum is essentially an addendum to require common sense when applying the Bolam test. The MM test essentially requires even more common sense than the Bolam-Bolitho (BB) test because it demands the doctor to establish what is material and relevant to the patient.

Don’t get me wrong, I think being patient-centric is good. How to achieve this is already cast in legal stone (Case law – MM Test) even though I am still trying to grapple with implementing this in my clinical practice. To this hobbit, essentially, the MM Test ignores a basic dimension of existence: time

For one, a three-step test doesn’t quite work for me when I see 40 patients a day and I prescribe hundreds of medications, investigations.

Secondly, what is relevant and material to the patient changes with time: – his circumstances changes and his memory fades. For the same procedure, what is of concern to him one month before the procedure can often be quite different when it is one week or the day before the procedure. And all this could be quite different one-month post-operation when his concerns are quite different from pre-op. As one doctor wisely said, “often the only relevant risk or complication is the one the patient develops post-op”.

Also, there are scientific studies to prove that a patient’s retention of information or advice given to him by the doctor is really quite limited and diminishes with time. You may have told him to your best effort what you think is relevant and material, but he may have forgotten or ignored what you said and he then turns around and sues you.

Another smaller issue about the MM test is the severity and likelihood matrix. As advocated, you should tell the patient the risk if it is more serious, even if it is unlikely). The most serious risk is of course death. Another doctor also said “once you mention “death”, the patient’s mind goes blank thereafter”. But the patient still signs the consent form and undergoes the procedure usually. And then he may also turn around and sue you later.

There is little doubt that the MM test brings increased uncertainty to the practice environment and doctors generally don’t like it. However, that doesn’t mean doctors are against being more patient-centric. It is an argument of false dichotomy to say that just because many doctors are uncomfortable with the MM test it suggests the medical profession is not supportive of being patient-centric.

Defensive Medicine

We now come to the difficult subject of defensive medicine.

Let us now return to the Judgment delivered on 12 May 2017 by CJ and four Judges of Appeal in the Hii Chii Kok vs London Lucien Ooi (a civil suit and NOT SMC case). This was when the MM test was introduced as case law. Here are excerpts from Paras 84, 85 and 87 “The argument for full retention (of Bolam and Bolitho)” (The portions I wish to emphasise are in italics and underlined)

84 What of the view that the Bolam test and Bolitho addendum should not be interfered with to any degree, even as regards advice? The strongest argument in favour of that view is the contention that if the Bolam test and Bolitho addendum were abandoned in favour of a standard that placed greater emphasis on the interests and perspective of the patient, it would spark an unacceptable increase in medical litigation. This would, it is said, have two deleterious effects: first, it would drive up the cost of medical malpractice insurance, and thus increase the costs of healthcare to the public, and second, it would increase the pressure on doctors to adopt what is commonly referred to as “defensive medicine”.……….(rest of para deleted)

85 It cannot be denied that the cost of healthcare and the practice of defensive medicine (which also feeds into the cost of healthcare to some extent) are both real concerns. However, we do not accept that they provide sufficient reason for the court to shut the door to reform entirely. In the first place, it has not been distinctly established that any departure from the Bolam test would in fact have the consequences of more medical litigation, higher insurance premiums and greater healthcare costs….. (portion deleted)….Furthermore, we note that certain factors which have driven up the cost of medical professional insurance in the US – the jurisdiction in which such concerns have been perhaps the most prominent – are not present in Singapore. The US legal system features jury awards which often would, in Singapore, be considered highly inflated; allows contingency fee arrangements (encouraging opportunistic negligence suits); and does not follow a “loser pays” principle of costs (thus reducing the disincentive for litigants or law firms to bring weak or speculative claims). In the absence of such factors in Singapore, we see no reason to believe, without clear evidence, that a carefully calibrated shift in the standard of care is likely to lead to a drastic increase in the frequency and value of medical negligence lawsuits in Singapore.

87 The problem of defensive medicine falls more squarely within the ambit of the court’s inquiry, since it directly implicates the question of whether the proposed standard will fortify or hinder the medical profession’s fulfilment of its duties to its patients. In that regard, we note that unlike a wholesale rejection of the Bolam test and Bolitho addendum, which the court in Gunapathy rightly warned against (at [144]), reform of the more limited nature being considered appears unlikely to contribute significantly to the practice of defensive medicine. The implications of Montgomery are limited to advice, whereas the concerns in defensive medicine pertain mainly to diagnosis and treatment……..We therefore do not think the spectre of defensive medicine is a strong reason to shy away from reform in the area of advice specifically.

Paras 84 to 87 in the 12 May 2017 Judgment on the Hii Chii Kok case was given as consideration on why a departure from Bolam and Bolitho can be seriously countenanced; the promulgation of the MM test then took place later in this Judgment. To summarise:

  • The fear of a rise in malpractice costs and increase in practice in defensive medicine are important considerations as to whether one should depart from the BB test
  • But these fears (as at 2017) were unproven and theoretical at best (i.e. not “distinctly established”)
  • Even if we depart from the BB test, Singapore does not have the pre-existing conditions (like in USA legal system) for a drastic increase in frequency and value of medical legal lawsuits, which in turn will lead to defensive medicine taking root quickly – i.e. contingency fees (i.e. loser pays) and high jury awards.
  • Defensive medicine doesn’t quite extend to the realm of medical advice (of which informed consent is a part of) and is limited to diagnosis and treatment.

Departure from BB test

In a study commissioned by the College of Family Physicians Singapore and Singapore Medical Association to examine the effect of the SMC Judgment in the LLA case on doctors’ behaviour earlier this year, it has been proven that these fears are clear and present and very real.

  • The number of doctors surveyed who provided an H&L injection decreased by 14.6%
  • The median price for the injection increased from the 0 to $100 band to >$100 to $200 band.
  • The number of surveyed doctors who charged more than $1000 went up eight-fold from 8 to 65.

This study therefore documents a quantitative increase in the practice of defensive medicine and healthcare costs when the BB test was departed from . It can be argued that the LLA outcome came about from a botched implementation of the MM test, but it is a departure from the BB test nonetheless.

The ‘free’ SMC process can lead to defensive medicine taking root quickly

The next point that Singapore does not have the pre-existing conditions that the US legal system has is interesting. It is true that Singapore doesn’t have high jury awards and contingency fees. But these advantages apply only to civil suits. For SMC complaints, the environment may be just as favourable for an increase in medical-legal complaints than the US – it is practically free to the complainant (no financial risk) to embark on a SMC complaint! The whole SMC disciplinary process may be no less frightening and painful to the doctor than a civil suit (if not more), hence the flight to defensive medicine in Singapore may be no less quick and intense than the US. So this assumption that Singapore legal system has a more agreeable climate to doctors is correct when applied mainly to civil suits. The doctor does not only flee towards defensive medicine out of fear of being sued in a civil case and paying hefty damages, but also out of fear of getting involved in the SMC complaints and disciplinary process, which is free to the complainant.

Defensive medicine is not static – it goes where the attack is targetted

Lastly, the point on defensive medicine being limited to diagnosis and treatment and not extending to medical advice needs some discussion. Let’s breakdown the words ‘defensive’ and ‘medicine’, for a start.

The practice of medicine is dynamic and ever-evolving. That is why we need to gain 50 CME points every two years, to keep us up to date with the changes in the practice of medicine. The practice of defensive medicine is no different, it is also evolving with the times. It is not static. Just because in the past the practice of defensive medicine is limited just to diagnosis and treatment does not mean that it will always be so.

The word ‘defensive’ has military roots, as in ‘defense’ and ‘attack’. Any SAF serviceman will tell you, defense is not static either. You prepare a robust, in-depth defense where you think the attack will most likely target. High profile cases involving senior doctors accused of not getting informed consent send a strong signal that patients (and lawyers) are focusing their efforts in this area. These well-known cases include Dr Eu Kong Weng, Dr Ang Peng Tiam, Dr Leslie Lam and this LLA case. It doesn’t matter if the complainants were successful or not, just the pain and trauma of going through responding to a complaint is sufficient motivation for doctors to focus their defensive efforts to prevent more complaints in this area.

Defensive medicine is divided into avoidance and assurance defensive medicine. Ordering more and unnecessary tests and investigations is a classic example of assurance defensive medicine because a doctor is afraid he will be complained against or sued for a missed diagnosis. Similarly, an information dump carried out because a doctor is afraid he will be complained against or sued in the area of medical advice, is in the opinion of this hobbit, a new form of assurance defensive medicine. The medical profession should not rigidly limit ourselves to what was previously described – that defensive medicine only exists in diagnosis and treatment. Defensive medicine will occur where the doctors think they will be attacked, be it in the areas of diagnosis, medical advice or treatment.

Information dumping
That brings us to the statement that information dumping is not defensive medicine because “giving too much information will not avoid legal liability” by our learned Judges. The judges are of course absolutely correct since from where they sit – what is inefficacious in avoiding legal liability in the court room or a disciplinary trial should not be considered as defensive medicine.

But as practicing doctors, I suppose, we have to look at things more upstream. As the age-old saying goes, “prevention is better than cure”. What is inefficacious in a disciplinary trial or the court room is an inefficacious or useless cure. But it may still work as a preventive measure. This is because it is human nature to take comfort in numbers or quantity. There are so many examples of this. We usually feel better when we write a longer answer to an exam question when compared to a shorter one (the test scores may have no correlation to the length of answer of course). We take psychological refuge in buying a thicker textbook than a thin one (whether we actually finish reading the textbook or understand what’s written inside is another matter altogether).

It is for the same reason that our consent forms are getting longer and longer. A longer consent form looks formidable and gives us psychological security. Remember the days when we could combine both the surgical and anaesthesia consent-taking into one page? Those days are gone. And if they still do exist, many would wonder – will such a short form suffice?

Due to information asymmetry, the buyer of a service also derives satisfaction and gauge quality by substitute measures of quantity (even though there is little correlation between quality and quantity). An inpatient given a lengthy discharge summary which is no more than a “cut-and-paste” job may think the medical officer has been diligent while a medical officer who has assiduously prepared a concise one-page discharge summary may be less appreciated. For about the same amount of money, a patient given 5 different drugs for common cough and cold often thinks he has been given quality treatment and may consequentially conclude the other doctor who gave him only 2 drugs earlier was tardy.

So, both doctors and patients derive comfort and satisfaction from quantity. This is just simple human nature. If that is so, we will also believe that with more information engendering more comfort and satisfaction, complaints are therefore less likely to occur. It is therefore no surprise that information dumping will be adopted in an attempt to prevent complaints from occurring, even though it is inefficacious in avoiding legal liability.

This psychological comfort derived from quantity is accentuated when there is greater uncertainty, as is the case with the MM test when compared with the BB test. The greater uncertainty arises because It is extremely difficult for a doctor to titrate accurately the exact amount and nature of information that is material and relevant to a particular patient in a particular context under the MM test. This hobbit thinks most doctors believe it is more likely that a patient is dissatisfied with less information than more. As such, most doctors will intuitively also believe that it is probably easier to prove a lack of informed consent arose from insufficient information rather than excessive information.

It should therefore come as no surprise that a doctor will give more information than what is actually needed.

Conclusion

After this long spiel of about 3300 words, what are the take-home messages? It’s still more of the same. We are a law-abiding profession in a society that enshrines the rule of law. Whatever is law, be it legislation or case-law, must be followed. There is no other way. Whatever this hobbit rambles or blabber about, is irrelevant and immaterial.

In the area of medical advice, this hobbit will still give substantially more information than he previously did in the BB test era. This is my form of Survival Medicine.

The answer to the question of when and how a generous amount of information limps across the line and qualifies as information dump, is best left to minds that are far more brilliant and incisive than this hobbit, who admittedly suffers from a little lack of this precious commodity called common sense. This lack may be a result of the imperfect hobbit condition that I am born into.

WMED Part 2: The SSC Case, What Goes Around Comes Around

On 21 May 2019, the SMC issued a press statement regarding psychiatrist Dr Soo Shuenn Chiang’s case that is to put it mildly, interesting.

Just to recap, Dr Soo was fined $50,000 by SMC for professional misconduct [Condensed from a previous posting: Weapons of Mass Ethics Destruction (WMED), published 9 Mar 2019]:

  1. Dr SSC was a victim of a patient’s brother who posed as the patient’s husband to deceive Dr SSC.
  2. Apparently, this imposter has not been punished so far for his act of pretending to be someone else.
  3. Dr SSC was fined $50,000 for writing and giving a memo to this imposter free-of-charge.
  4. The imposter told Dr SSC the patient was apparently suicidal and needed to be admitted to IMH against her will under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act.
  5. Dr SSC’s main sin was that of failure to verify the imposter’s identity and authorisation. It is important to reproduce here the entire paragraph (para. 30) from the Grounds of Decision (GD):

We also note that the preventive actions (i.e. verification of identity and authorisation) to be taken were not onerous. As submitted by Counsel for the SMC, the steps to be taken by Dr Soo were simple. We could only conclude that the failure of Dr Soo to take such steps reflected both a lack of concern for or appreciation of the required standards and an indifference to the patient’s medical confidentiality.

Now fast forward to the 21 May Press Statement. The SMC is now applying to the Court of Three Judges (C3J) for Dr Soo’s conviction to be set aside, as SMC has received new information that “raises doubt on the circumstances surrounding the incident, in the interest of justice”.

It is very important to note that the original application by SMC to the High Court was “for an extension to appeal for a reduction of the fine imposed on against Dr Soo”. In other words, the original intent was a reduction in the fine/punishment has now been changed to quashing the conviction. If this goes through, Dr Soo will NOT be guilty of professional misconduct, and not be fined less. He won’t be fined at all, if the conviction is set aside.

Apparently after the DT’s decision to fine Dr Soo $50,000 broke, the patient’s brother posted his version of the story on social media. Arising from this, “SMC approached both the patient’s brother and husband to record their statements. These statements were not obtained by the Complaints Committee (CC) prior to its referral of the patient’s complaint against Dr Soo for a formal inquiry by a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT)”.

What this seems to suggest is that:

  1. The CC worked on a different set of information that was deemed as facts. The CC had come to the conclusion that it had to refer Dr Soo to the DT.
  2. The DT, working on the same set of facts, convicted Dr Soo and fined him $50,000.
  3. However, since taking statements from the patient’s brother and husband, there is a new set of information and “facts”.
  4. This new set of information or facts “raises doubt” on the circumstances of the incident, which of course also raised doubt as to whether Dr Soo should have been convicted at all
  5. Therefore, the SMC will now be applying to C3J to set aside the conviction.

This is a Face Palm X 50,000 times moment. One Face Palm per dollar.

Firstly, allow this hobbit to declare that this blog is not an attempt to influence the outcome of the appeal hearing, but a discussion about what has apparently transpired so far that led to Dr Soo’s conviction and the SMC’s appeal to set aside that conviction, based on what is publicly available especially the 21 May press statement and the SMC DT’s Grounds of Decision for this case.

Basically, SMC CC and SMC investigators (if any were involved at all) did not verify the facts, then proceeded to refer the case to DT, which in turn convicted and punished Dr Soo for not verifying the facts.

The irony is so thick, you can cut it with a lightsaber-sized diathermy. The accuser who accused Dr Soo for not verifying the facts was in fact, itself guilty of not verifying the facts.

This hobbit doesn’t know whether to laugh or to cry. Someone should write this into a play or something like that and make it into a literature textbook for secondary school students.

But it is good that at least some folks now finally appear to understand the word “doubt”. Because SMC disciplinary proceedings are ‘quasi-criminal’ proceedings, “doubt” is an especially important word. In criminal proceedings, the accused is deemed innocent until proven guilty. The burden of proof in criminal proceedings is “beyond reasonable doubt”, which is a very high threshold or stringent test to convict a person. That means a person can only be found guilty in a criminal proceeding when it is beyond reasonable doubt he is indeed guilty.

The same threshold applies to SMC disciplinary proceedings, although one must be forgiven if one questions whether the test of “beyond reasonable doubt” has been really competently applied in some cases, given how doctors appear to so easily convicted.

So, when you did not verify the facts before hand, and you are now unsure if the facts were even correct in the first instance, how you can say Dr Soo is “beyond reasonable doubt” guilty of professional misconduct”? Naturally, the SMC now has to apply for the conviction to be set aside, “in the interest of justice” after prosecuting him in the first place. The SMC is now just only appealing against itself but of course, the ultimate power and decision to set aside or not the  SMC DT Judgment, rests with the independent C3J.

Let is now go back to parts of para. 30 of the Grounds of Decision again for the sucker punch:

“We could only conclude that the failure of Dr Soo to take such steps reflected both a lack of concern for or appreciation of the required standards and an indifference to the patient’s medical confidentiality”.

Please note the bits in bold. If you edit the bold bits accordingly, it can also apply to whoever in SMC who was supposed to verify the facts before the CC and DT could decide on the case:

“We could only conclude that the failure of SMC to take such steps reflected both a lack of concern for or appreciation of the required standards and an indifference to Dr Soo’s rights to justice through a disciplinary process that is based on verified (not purported) facts surrounding the case”.

Obviously, the SMC also suffers from not having the services of a “verificationologist”!

An important question that needs to be asked is, how true was the original complaint, in the light of new information? All complaints made to the SMC are accompanied by a statutory declaration, which is a very serious undertaking. If the facts are so different, and that the statutory declaration was made based on false information, what further steps should be taken, to investigate and perhaps even punish the person who made a false statutory declaration? Was the disparity between old and new information just a difference in perspective or opinion, or a complete falsification of events and facts and an act of deception by a person?

Given the fact that investigations can now only be performed at the CC level and NOT the DT level, another question that needs to be asked is, what actual investigations (if any) were done for Dr Soo’s case? The larger question is, does SMC just take the complaints at face value and proceed to hear any case at the CC level, just because a complaint is accompanied by a statutory declaration?

Since we are on the subject of how to deal with complaints, it is heartening to note that on the same day (21 May 2019) it was reported that the MOH Review Workgroup (to review SMC) would look into screening out repeat cases and vexatious and frivolous complaints. MOH said that “such cases can make up about 10% of the complaints to SMC annually”. Currently, as long as someone makes a statutory declaration (which can be done for free at the SMC office), a CC has to be formed to look into the complaint, no matter how unreasonable or frivolous or vexatious the complaint appears to be.

MOH also said that “patients may face a time limit when filing complaints against doctors to the SMC in the future”. (CNA Report: Patient may face time limit to file complaints on misconduct of doctors: MOH). MOH noted that “quality of evidence would be diminished and that such a limit makes the process fairer”. The same report said that there were complaints brought to SMC even more than 15 years after the incident happened.

The suggested time-bar for making complaints has been said to be between 3 to 6 years (according to a Straits Times article dated 21 May 2019 – “Workgroup’s report aims to make medical disciplinary process fairer and faster”), which is reasonable and in fact already very generous. Currently there is no time bar at all for complaints made to SMC.

The Straits Times report also said this review workgroup will also clarify what exactly constitutes professional misconduct as well as informed consent. A clear understanding of both are necessary so that doctors will avoid practicing defensive medicine and over-treating patients and push up healthcare costs.

This hobbit thinks these are steps in the right direction and are long overdue. In addition, SMC should look into dismissing vexatious and frivolous complaints with costs so that these complainants know that there is a potential financial downside to their actions. This is not new, as The Law Society is already empowered to do so.

There appears to be some light at the end of tunnel. What has been reported is encouraging. But more can and should be done. This includes looking into how SMC, CC and DTs are constituted. How are the people who sit on SMC, CC and DTs chosen and trained to do the job they are supposed to do? The same principles apply to SMC prosecution lawyers – how are they chosen? How are they instructed by SMC? Who reviews their performance? In the area of informed consent, how can we have more clarity and flexibility at the same time (as said by Senior Minister of State for Health and Law Edwin Tong)?

The expectations are high that this workgroup will make a big difference to the currently manifestly unsatisfactory situation. But as a profession, we are also used to big disappointments. Hope for the best, prepare for the worst. I will still practise Survival Medicine for now.