And so, it has come to pass that the Courts of Singapore has ruled in the insurer’s favour in the case where a policyholder sued Prudential Assurance Company Singapore for denial of claim for a critical illness policy.
This policy was a supplementary benefit riding on a life insurance policy the claimant had bought, and it was called “Early Crisis Cover Multiplier”. This was reported in Channels New Asia “https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/woman-loses-prudential-suit-brain-surgery-reject-buried-clause-6360136”
This hobbit will not discuss the background of the case here as it had been described in some detail in two earlier posts:
Many have commented on this case, and some have said the learned judge in this case erred. This hobbit begs to differ.
What is any judge expected to do? A judge is supposed to come to a decision or judgement based on:-
- legislations passed by Parliament and his interpretation of how Parliament had originally intended for these legislations to achieve or be interpreted.
- his understanding of Common Law tenets and principles, where there are no specific legislations. (Common Law is a legal system developed by the English which Singapore has largely adopted. There are also other legal systems such as Civil Law)
In short, the learned Judge has given his judgment and answered the legal question(s) of the case.
But many non-legal questions which cannot be answered from a lawsuit remain unanswered, which is why there is still much disquiet out there over this incident. These include
- Why is the policy even allowed to be classified as critical illness or critical disease policy or plan when the payout is NOT just dependent on the diagnosis but the treatment modality as well? To minimise misunderstanding and even misrepresentation, should it not be called critical illness AND specified treatment plan?
- Why is the insurer so adamant about not paying out the policy because the specified treatment was not used but some other treatment modality was employed instead? How does that affect the insurer because the payout is a fixed payout that is not dependent on treatment costs?
- To the public, how many people will read the fine print for each of the critical illnesses descriptions in the policy?
- And even if they did, how many would understand the difference between open craniotomy vs endovascular surgery (ES) and know the implications? How many healthcare workers know the difference between the two modalities, let alone laypeople?
- Healthcare professionals will ask, why is an insurer even allowed to sell such plans with such clauses when ES was already the preferred modality and hence the standard of care in the developed world four years before this policy was sold and 20 years after the first ES was performed in Singapore? To add insult to injury, the insurer was allowed to sell a policy that explicitly stated that the prevailing standard of care was not covered “Endovascular repair or procedures are not covered (para 22 of [2026] SGDC 276).
In other words, while the verdict of the lawsuit has answered the legal question(s) quite adequately, we need to ask, do current laws and insurance regulatory framework offer enough protection to the public? Or put more simply, does the current regulatory framework still adequately serve public interest? While it may not be a zero-sum game, from the experience of this case, the current regulatory framework certainly adequately serves the insurance companies’ interest.
Obviously, people buy an insurance product for “peace of mind”. And in this instance, it obviously only gives the the vast majority of buyers the illusion of peace of mind at the point of sale or purchase and nothing much else. After all, as said in an earlier post, 80% to 90% of ruptured aneurysms are treated by ES nowadays and only 10 to 20% are treated by open craniotomy. It is only not an illusion if you belong to that group of people who read the policy contract and actually understood the difference and implications between craniotomy and ES and still bought this critical illness policy.
This is aggravated by the fact that a ruptured aneurysm is a life-threatening condition which the patient has practically no control over. In this case, the patient was conveyed by a state-run ambulance to a public hospital and given good care and yet the insurer could still legally walk away without paying out on the policy because of how the policy was contractually structured using highly technical considerations such as craniotomy vis a vis ES. Mercantile considerations do not even come into play here since only public not-for-profit resources were utilized in the care of this patient.
This brings to mind a story this hobbit heard long ago from a pioneer cardiothoracic surgeon (who has since passed away). He trained and worked in the early days before a heart-lung machine was available in Singapore. To perform surgery on the heart, the heart rate had to be slowed down significantly. This was done by putting the patient in a bath tub and immersing his body in ice cubes and cold water to induce hypothermia. The hypothermia would slow down the patient’s heart rate so that surgery could be attempted. Sometimes the patient would survive the hypothermia, sometimes he won’t. Things got a lot better when Singapore had its first heart-lung machine in 1965.
What is there to stop insurers to also surreptitiously slip in such a clause that states a heart attack can only be treated by cardiac bypass surgery with hypothermia for a payout to happen? This may sound like a ridiculous and anachronistic example but if you think deeper, it isn’t. The use of the heart-lung machine versus inducing hypothermia comes with differences in risk and favourable (or poor) outcomes, these considerations are not much different from treating a ruptured aneurysm with ES or open craniotomy. The underlying principles of risk and outcome, and total disregard for the prevailing standard of care are common in these two examples. All you need is to hire a good lawyer to draft the policy contract well and it will be just as airtight as the critical illness policy highlighted in this law suit.
At the end of the day, there remain two fundamental irreducible questions of principle that regulators should answer when looking at the current regulatory framework for insurance companies:
- Current relevant laws are targeted mainly at ensuring the solvency and financial soundness of insurance companies, i.e. the ability of insurers to pay claims to policyholders. This focus facilitates public trust in insurers. But that is only one part of trust. If the public no long trust insurers because insurers can seek protection behind highly technical and obscure terms in well-constructed contracts and hence legally not make payouts, then overall trust is still eroded. Trust has many facets, and solvency and financial soundness is but one aspect.
- The financial and insurance industry subscribes to the Suitability Standard. Healthcare professionals such as doctors adopt the Fiduciary Standard in establishing what is the prevailing standard of care. The Suitability Standard enables a critical illness plan to state that only an open craniotomy and not the prevailing standard of care will qualify for a payout because open craniotomy remains a suitable option even when better options exist. The Suitability Standard may be acceptable in situations when insurance products are more understandable to the layman and information asymmetry is not very great, e.g. travel insurance, fire insurance, vehicle insurance etc. But as seen in this case of health- or illness- related insurance, where the information asymmetry is great, it could be convincingly argued that the Suitability Standard should be dispensed with, and a higher standard, the Fiduciary Standard should be adopted instead. The degree of information asymmetry is a critical consideration here, which is why the medical profession is held to the higher Fiduciary Standard because it is acknowledged that great information asymmetry exists between the doctor and the patient.
The hobbit doesn’t know how the relevant insurance regulators think.
On one hand they can maintain that the current regulatory framework still protects public interest adequately and trust in the insurance industry is limited to that of the solvency and financial soundness aspects. They can also maintain that the Suitability Standard should remain applicable in areas even when the information asymmetry is great.
On the other hand, they could also try to do more to perhaps better address public trust in the insurance industry that extends beyond solvency and financial soundness (After all, Singapore is a financial hub and it should lead the way in such matters), and also acknowledge that the great information asymmetry that exists between the insurer and the insured in health and medical matters should be scrutinised under a more stringent test than that of the Suitability Standard.