Life as a GP used to be simple. But it’s not so simple anymore. And this hobbit is not even talking about Healthier SG and the NEHR. We are just talking about signing up as a member of the Royal College of GP in the UK.
As expected, you need to fill up a form when you apply to be a member. The link to the form is as given below at the end of this post. You are asked to declare your gender identity and you are given the following choices:
- Prefer Not To Say
- Man
- Woman
- Transgender
- Genderqueer
- Agender
- Genderless
- Non-Binary
- Cis Man
- Cis Woman
- Trans Man
- Trans Woman
- Third Gender
- Two-Spirit
- Bigender
- Genderfluid
The form does not say you have to choose only one out of the above choices. Presumably you can pick more than one?
This hobbit is not making this up. I think when society gets this complicated, it is time to leave where you are and live out your days in a tiny hamlet or a remote island. So that you can figure out what is the difference between “Agender”, “Genderless” and Non-Binary”. Seriously, perhaps the RCGP can conduct some very meaningful CME on what each of the above options mean. I hope our CFPS doesn’t follow RCGP’s footsteps in making the world a more complicated place than it already is.
Thankfully, life in Singapore is much simpler. Most of the time. All the folks need to know is whether your clinic has signed up as a Healthier SG clinic or not and whether your clinic system is NEHR-ready or not.
Speaking of NEHR, the recent Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) cyberattack on Synapxe (formerly IHIS) resulted in public healthcare institutions websites being down for seven to eight hours on 1 Nov 23.
This is a very unfortunate event which has been summarised by The Straits Times’ Senior Health Correspondent Ms Salma Khalik on 2 November as “Having the websites of nationwide public healthcare institutions go down may not be severe, as critical services were not affected. But people’s trust in the efficiency and high level of security of government IT platforms may be shaken as a result. That is the real fallout”.
Synapxe issued a press release on 3 November 23 stating that “Patient data and the internal networks remained accessible and unaffected. Patient care was not compromised”. However it did also state that “On 1 November 2023, an abnormal surge in network traffic was detected at 9.15am. This surge circumvented the blocking service, and overwhelmed Synapxe’s firewall behind the blocks. This triggered the firewall to filter out the traffic, and all the websites and internet-reliant services became inaccessible”.
The press release further noted that “DDoS attacks cannot be prevented, and the defences against DDoS attacks will have to constantly evolve to keep up with advancements”.
The public sector Electronic Medical Record (EMR) and NEHR systems were unaffected and hence “patient care was not compromised”. This is because since the Singhealth Cyberattack of 2018, the EMR and Health Information Systems (HIS) in public healthcare institutions have been delinked from the Internet. The government and the public healthcare clusters have the enormous resources to implement this. Today, there are separate computers for clusters’ clinical staff to access the internet for research and other purposes that are totally delinked from the EMR or HIS systems. It would be beyond the resources of private sector clinics, whether GP or specialist, to run a Clinic Management System (CMS) that is not internet-based or -linked.
In fact, most, if not all of the HSG/NEHR-compliant CMS being offered on the market are cloud-based and use existing internet browser interfaces. Gone are also the days when the clinic database is stored on a hard disk located inside the clinic.
If “DDoS attacks cannot be prevented” and somehow the “blocking service” could be “circumvented” by a surge, then how would private sector clinics continue working in the event of a determined and massive DDoS attack if the attack targets the private sector? Indeed, while patient care in the public sector wasn’t affected, many GPs will tell you that the Patient Risk Profile Portal (PRPP) could not be accessed on 1 Nov and hence vaccination information could not be submitted on that day. You can still submit this on another day I suppose, but one cannot say patient care was entirely unaffected in the private sector, as was the case with the public sector.
Could a doomsday situation happen when all private sector clinics’ CMS are knocked out by a Mother of All DDoS Attacks on the several IT systems that can link up with the NEHR and have been pre-approved as HSG-compliant? And if so, what happens? What is the backup plan to keep private sector clinics running if this happens on a nationwide scale? Are we prepared for such a scenario? On another note, do private hospitals also face similar risks with their EMR and HIS systems in the context of DDoS attacks?
This hobbit is no IT expert and these are tough questions that obviously this hobbit does not have the answers to. But he certainly hopes some folks in MOH and Synapxe do.
Since we are also on the subject matter of forms and making things complicated, let us move on to talk about a local example of a misguided use (or rather, denial of use) of forms. A private sector doctor who wanted to opt out of the NEHR told this hobbit that he has found out the only way to do so is to obtain the opt-out forms from public healthcare institutions (link below). Which is kind of a strange arrangement. This probably has come out of some super-bright, savant-level mind who has deluded/convinced himself/herself into believing that ONLY the public sector can be trusted with the simple task of ensuring that the person who wants to opt out of NEHR is provided with the relevant information to make an informed decision.
The private sector can be allowed to do organ transplants, offer proton beam therapy and separate conjoint twins but cannot be entrusted/empowered to tell a person what he needs to know in order that he can make an informed decision whether to stay in or opt-out of NEHR? The private GP can be empowered to be MOH’s main partners in delivering HSG but cannot be entrusted/empowered to tell the patient what he needs to know about the consequences of opting out of NEHR? If a person opts out of NEHR, he is automatically disqualified from enrolling onto HSG. No enrolees, no HSG, no business for the GP. If there is one thing consistent about private sector GPs – they don’t do stuff that is bad for business. Enrolling patients for HSG is good for business, which is why we see healthy enrolment numbers now.
It makes this “opt-out of NEHR form” sound like a weapon of mass destruction that has to be kept in a sealed bunker or vault that can withstand a nuclear attack and is guarded round-the-clock by commandoes.
Seriously, in Singapore, you can obtain birth or death certificates, submit your tax returns just by simply logging on to government websites using SingPass on your handphone but you have to visit a public healthcare institution in person just to obtain this mystical form so as to opt-out of the NEHR? What is more important in life than birth and death and taxes??
The genius who came up with this policy really needs to think again and do better. Why make life so unnecessarily complicated?
RCGP online application form:
Opting out of NEHR:
https://www.synapxe.sg/healthtech/national-programmes/national-electronic-health-record-nehr/faq